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Sidney Milkis and Jerome M. Mileur, eds., Progressivism and the New 
Democracy (Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 1999). 
At the heart of Progressivism and the New Democracy lurks a contradiction that 
simply won't go away. It's the tension between the ideals of what democracy can 
be and the reality of politics as it is played out in practice. This dialectic almost 
always fosters heated debate and this book is no exception. Most of the articles 
in the collection unpack both the ideals and practical elements within 
Progressivism, tracing its legacy of institutional reform throughout the twentieth 
century. The results of this reform are a far cry from the noble aspirations of the 
founders of the "new democracy." 
Sidney Milkis introduces the volume by asking us to consider the essays in 
light of three major questions: What is similar between the Progressive period 
and now? Did the Progressive Era shape contemporary American politics? What 
might have been addressed that wasn't during that time period? He 
automatically sets up this book to become relevant to debates about democracy 
today, and on most counts, the articles do a good job in making the connection. 
The last question, however, often falls short of its offer. Rather than illuminating 
strains of thought and practice within Progressivism that might have borne more 
productive fruit, many of the authors in this volume prefer to focus on hindsight 
to judge the limitations of Progressivism. This, perhaps, is the major weakness 
of the volume - a tone steeped in what ifs, regrets, and embarrassment given 
what we now know, rather than building the future from the wisdom of history. 
Having understood the richness of ideas and institutions that were 
Progressivism, and its links to current debates, we're mostly left feeling jaded 
and betrayed by the inability of Progressives to resolve the tension between 
theory and practice. 
Nonetheless, unpacking the unevenness of the development of democracy 
as well as uncovering the tension that marks democracy illuminates some key 
issues that should be heeded as we face the challenge of rethinking democracy 
in the twenty-first century. These issues include: clarifying the goal of 
democracy (is it for fair deliberation or as means to other ends, be it social 
control, nation building or social and economic reform?); outlining the dilemma 
of scale facing democracy and its (in)ability to work effectively at the state level; 
and focussing on the transformative possibilities of democracy (as opposed to 
the descriptive and regulating role that institutionalizes existing inequalities). 
THE GOOD LIFE VS. GETTING THE JOB DONE 
In the Progressive vision, politics was to return to playing its key role in the 
good life. After watching local party bosses control their constituencies in less 
than democratic ways, Progressives were searching for a return to the nobler 
aims of some of America's founders. A national government that transcended 
parochial interests and local fiefdoms in the name of the greater public was the 
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goal. Democracy would be transferred directly from the individual to the 
national government, bypassing the cynicism that party politics had come to 
offer. 
Alongside this vision of the "good life," however, was the need to achieve a 
number of social and economic goals. The transition period that bridged the end 
of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century marked the move 
from what Mileur calls a "simplerAmerica" - small scale, localist and grounded 
in the values of small towns and the countryside - to a more "socially diverse and 
complex America." Economic and social goals were grand in scale and 
increasingly national in focus while more professional, urban and secular in 
values. The new "robber barons" left the older elites restless and discontented 
while populist revolts erupted in the west against the bosses of the two-party 
political system in the east. Immigration increased dramatically at this time and 
the numbers of poor swelled in the slums of the growing metropolitan cities. The 
challenge to both control the terms of, and more equitably distribute, wealth 
required a new political vision. 
As the twenty-first century dawns, the picture is strikingly similar in many 
ways. Merger mania and growing concentration of ownership mark capitalism 
as high tech advances threaten deep changes in the nature of production and 
consumption patterns. A mode of regulation that addresses the growing gap 
between dot-com millionaires and the service underclass is required. Both 
labour and consumer markets are more deeply bifurcated than they have been in 
the last fifty years, reflecting a partitioned world of haves and have nots. Political 
participation meanwhile, has dropped to all-time lows especially among 
marginalized communities. Politics has become synonymous with professional 
and organized interests and far removed from the individual. Democracy today, 
faces a crisis of legitimacy. 
Viewed by many as the birth of the modem day welfare state, the challenge 
of Progressivism was to link democracy with these broader social and economic 
reforms. The authors in this volume, however, are cautious about heralding 
Progressives as the great social visionaries of their time. The results of their 
efforts appear minimal at best; a mix of bold social advances that erupted largely 
because of extraordinary circumstances, whlle capitalism remained largely 
unchanged and minimally regulated. 
Morton Keller's article suggests that the forces that propelled the 
development of the modem American state were all there in the Progressive 
period: corruption and efficiency in government; corporate consolidation and 
maldistribution of wealth in the economy; race and gender relations as well as 
immigration issues. Moreover, the techniques developed by Progressives to 
mobilize public opinion outside the political system (primarily the use of mass 
media and interest groups) are still those used today. Nonetheless, the 
circumstances for change in the early twentieth century were quite different 
from now. Major Progressive social achievements focused on Prohibition, 
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woman's suffrage and immigration restriction. These achievements, according 
to Keller, were possible for one of two reasons: because the Progressive 
movement was able to forge large-scale coalitions on particular issues, and 
because the sheer scale of World War I allowed for an expansion of national 
powers. Otherwise, suggests Keller, large-scale economic regulation was 
limited. Instead, policies in regulating the railway, the transportation industry in 
general and public utilities were "past-laden, incremental and particularistic in 
nature," forced, as they were, to face very powerful interests. 
Where Keller considered some of the social advances "bold in nature, 
Eileen McDonagh sees a "policy paradox." Institutional advances had the effect 
of limiting and further marginalizing political participation for large groups of 
marginalized Americans. Progressives, she argues, developed an institutional 
capacity for both increasing the welfare of those individuals who had become 
victims of capitalism (workman's compensation, minimum wage, urban 
housing codes, child welfare and labour laws, mother's pensions, etc.), and 
expanded the tools for governing (the use of the referendum, recall, direct 
election of senators, the use of the primaries and other electoral legislation). 
These institutional practices, however, were developed within a "centrist 
progressivism" that carried with those advances, other goals of social control. 
Women's suffrage, for instance, wasn't so much about giving women the same 
rights as men, as it was a means to reinforce women's domestic and maternal 
identities, while Prohibition was a form of social control over immigrant and 
black communities. It wasn't until the civil rights struggles of the 1960s and 
1970s that a ''left progressivism" developed to counteract the exclusionary 
elements of earlier Progressive attempts. The focus for political change during 
this time period (weakening the seniority system in Congress, increasing 
congressional control of the budget proce& and opening congressional hearings 
to the public) was the informal process of how politics operated. As a result, she 
sees this time period as one in which participation at the base was successfully 
enlarged. 
If Keller and McDonagh believe that Progressivism held at least had some 
aspirations towards greater social and economic reform, Eisenach's article on 
Progressive Internationalism suggests a much more straightforward link 
between Progressivism and nation building. Using the religious and spiritual 
language of Progressive Internationalism, a language that focused on the 
morality of personal responsibility, social justice and democratic community, 
the Progressive movement was largely about articulating the American nation in 
all areas of life - government institutions, academic life, religion, public 
education, small business and international investment. Progressivism was not a 
series of ad hoc reforms, nor was it solely a focus on building a "new 
democracy," but a cohesive platform for building the great American nation. The 
war facilitated the process and the Depression of the 1930's further consolidated 
the nation in a number of areas of daily life. The legacy, however, came to favour 
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material progress over the more spiritual project of building the "city on a hill" 
thus hollowing out the soul of Progressivism and making it vulnerable to attack 
from a number of different moral angles as time wore on. 
The desire then to build a more noble form of politics that would engage 
citizen debate and leave behind corrupt power systems, would only face limited 
success when faced with the paralleled task of actually bettering the lives of 
millions of Americans. The legacy of Progressivism suggests that the ends 
became far more important than the means to those ends, a legacy that has 
plunged democracy into its current crisis. 
DEMOCRACY'S DILEMMA OF SCALE 
If being unable to balance the tension between the good life and getting 
things done resulted in both a limited level of regulating capitalism and an even 
more questionable legacy of democracy, so too did the issue of scale. One of the 
major legacies of Progressivism was to transform federalism from a 
straightforward constitutional arrangement to a political ideology. In the name 
of nation building, Progressives used amendments to change the constitution. 
They expanded national power (especially inter-state commerce regulation) and 
enhanced the role of the federal judiciary indirectly by limiting other political 
forms like parties. Politics moved from the level of the states to the national 
level. Underlying this shift was a political ideology that moved from the more 
conflictual notion of federalism outlined by the founders to a form of popular 
sovereignty. This latter model presumed noble participation and cooperation 
rather than conflict, a goal which Jerome Mileur views as nai've and 
incompatible with the political realities ofthe day. 
Unlike the present, where direct democracy is often articulated as an 
absence of government, Progressives saw citizenship (through unions, reform 
movements, universities and other groups) extending beyond traditional politics 
and bypassing the corrupt role of political parties. Constitutional and 
institutional changes in this period fundamentally altered the business of politics 
such that individual and extra-political interests overrode political parties. The 
referendum was introduced during this period to enhance individual 
participation in politics. The right to recall, the development of the primary for 
use in political party elections, and the direct election of senators all enhanced 
individual involvement at the expense of political parties. In many instances, the 
mass media was used as a direct conduit to the mass audience, appearing more 
democratic at the time than existing political institutions. 
Ironically, the great Progressive vision of politically engaged individuals 
fostered a legacy ofpolitical cynicism and a turning away from politics. The very 
instruments Progressives used to develop a strong state that wasn't governed by 
local political chiefs but by individuals, became the instruments used to 
undermine that goal. The mass media mixed politics and advertising into a 
potent stew of entertainment that privatized and trivialized real political 
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discourse and handed it back to people in sound-bite pieces. As a result, the tone 
of democracy changed. And while the tone changed, so too did the more formal 
political process. Undemocratically elected interest groups began to play a more 
significant role as political parties, constrained by a century of reforms that 
limited their effectiveness, waned. 
As democracy moved from the local to the national level, virtually 
bypassing the middle ground of the states, problems of representation were 
bound to erupt. How couldthe national state, so far removed from the individual, 
actually represent those interests in a fair and effective manner? Overcoming 
parochialism, though a noble goal in and of itself, was simply not enough to 
effectively replace local representation. Whether viewed as having an 
inadequate institutional apparatus or offering tools that could be turned against 
them (referenda, interest groups) Progressives denied that there was a problem 
of scale. As a result, the backlash came from the state level, where initiatives like 
California's Proposition 13 invoked democracy as a means to lessen the state's 
influence in favour of expressing individual preferences on key social issues 
through regular referenda. 
DELIBERATIVE VS. PLURALISTIC DEMOCRACY 
Does this mean that the institutions developed by Progressives were 
inadequate for the challenge? Did their naivete in fostering a high maintenance 
democracy actually create a vacuum at the state level for power brokers to 
institutionalize a form of democracy that simply maintained existing power 
relations? This question is now at the centre of many debates around democracy. 
Social democrats insist that we need a practical and realistic vision of 
democracy that invokes democracy but focuses more on social reform. 
Meanwhile, radical socialists and communitarians insist that democracy should 
be built outside the state and inside civil society groups. The goal, in the latter 
case, is to avoid balancing the tension between the state and democracy 
altogether focusing, instead, on building a democracy movement of diverse 
voices that challenges, rather than defends, capitalism. 
Philip Ethington's excellent article on "The Metropolis and Multicultural 
Ethics" offers an interesting description of the same tension that developed 
within the Progressive movement at the turn of the twentieth century. Ethington 
uncovers a tradition of what he calls "deliberative democracy" - a strain of 
Progressivism most commonly associated with the Chicago Pragmatists of John 
Dewey, George Herbert Mead and Jane Adams, and which actually attempted to 
deal with the connection between democracy and diversity. 
In the urban metropolises of turn-of-the-century America, intercultural 
conflict was inescapable. Democracy then, would need to accommodate an 
ethical pluralism of sorts. This strain of Progressives believed that ethics no 
longer needed to remain universal but could be located in a pragmatic 
democratic dialogue between various groups. This didn't mean democracy for 
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its own sake, but as a way to solve the problem of alienation. And since liberal 
democracy offered no vision for ethical choice, a more revolutionary form was 
needed. 
There were limitations in these theories, however, the major being the desire 
to overcome socio-cultural difference and build consensus in a way that would 
only maintain existing inequalities. It was W.E.B. Dubois who exposed the 
limits of their thought. Dubois illustrated the relations of cultural power that 
eluded the Chicago Pragmatists. They couldn't imagine a process that involved 
working together on values rather than forging consensus out of the divisions. 
And it was this inability that made broader coalition work with marginalized 
groups difficult in the longer term. 
Ethington suggests that the loose coalition that marked Progressivism 
splintered into two theoretical camps by 1920. The advocates of "deliberative 
democracy" were set off against the "group behavioralists" who used rational, 
science-based arguments to explain how democracy worked to mediate the 
interests of individuals. Democracy became the neutral and objective mediating 
force between a plurality of interests, rather than a forum in which to discuss 
ethical issues. As a description without prescription, it was easily molded by 
various groups and consolidated as a hegemonic ideology, while those who 
hoped to use it as a form of radical change receded into the background. 
What this means for those who wish to reignite the "deliberative 
democratic" vision, is that the challenge has not only not gone away, it has 
intensified. Both the Right and the Left are caught between wanting to advance 
social and economic goals through existing political channels and knowing that 
those channels have become more and more distanced from the broader public. 
The tendency has been to devote resources to court challenges and class action 
suits that may offer quicker victories but also widen the distance between the 
majority of citizens and political actors. 
What those in the "deliberative democratic" camp began at the turn of the 
twentieth century now becomes a solid footing for revisioning the work of 
democracy in the twenty-first. The link between democracy and diversity is key. 
And what we have learned since Progressives first made that link is a greater 
respect for difference while working in coalitions, a desire, perhaps, to forge 
periodic moments of democracy outside the formal hnctioning of the state. 
Greater inclusion at this level, may well avoid the "policy paradox" outlined by 
McDonagh. Simply changing institutions without building a solid base for that 
change will often result in maintaining existing power relations. This need not 
occur at the expense of institutional reform, but as we have learned from the 
Progressive legacy, institutions are only as effective as the participation upon 
which they depend. 
Overall, Milkis and Mileur offer an intriguing and complex understanding 
of Progressivism as viewed through the lens of democracy. While it often raises 
more questions than answers, this lens makes the history more relevant to 
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political struggles today. Whether in America or around the world, democracy 
does face a deep crisis of legitimacy and attempts to combat that crisis in ways 
that offer greater representation are similar to the challenges facing Progressives 
as they struggled to revision the American nation at the beginning of the last 
century. 
Democracy, of course, is not simply a political system. It is deeply linked to 
the development of capitalism. As such, the book could have offered more 
insight into how democracy and capitalism became intertwined, and how they 
may now require a separation of sorts in order to find the room to rethink a more 
radical democratic vision. There is an underlying assumption that lurks behind 
many of the articles in this volume and yet is only clearly articulated in Jerome 
Mileur's closing essay. It is that politics is the art of compromise and any 
attempts to aspire to more radical or noble ends is not only naive, but may cause 
more damage in the long run. This effectively blames Progressives for the sins of 
those who came after them. It limits our ability to think outside the institutional 
box long enough to offer more a radical vision of democracy. Despite being 
unable to deal with this dialectic in a more constructive manner, the book 
describes well the dilemma facing Progressivism. It is a dilemma that will mark 
politics for the foreseeable future, one which may not offer an easy resolution 
but requires our energies all the same. 
Anne Breckenridge 
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Orin Starn, Nightwatch: The Politics of Protest in the Andes (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1999). 
For better or worse, in the 1980s and early 1990s Peru came to mean something 
more than Machu Picchu and the Nazca lines to the outside world. As 
Communist regimes around the world came tumbling down, Peru witnessed the 
growth of a radical, and for a while, successful, self-styled Maoist movement, 
the Peruvian Communist Party-Shining Path. However, as anthropologist Orin 
Starn shows in Nightwatch: The Politics of Protest in the Andes, the brutal 
Shining Path was not the only "movement for change" in Peru in those years. 
First organised in 1976, by the end of the decade peasant night patrol groups or 
rondas campesinas had spread throughout the northern Peruvian Andes, 
covering some 3,400 villages across over 60,000 square miles. Though by the 
late 1990s they had begun to unravel, the rondas constitute one of the most 
important yet little known social movements of the late twentieth century in 
.Latin America. 
Starn is clearly sympathetic to the rondas campesinas he studies. The 
rondas did not solve the problems of Peru's northern peasantry, most of which 
